INI View

Why India Should Test Now

posted on May 17, 2007
Theodore Taylor, a former US nuclear weapons testing expert, says that to be able to build boosted fission and fusion weapons would require a full-scale testing programme at yields between a quarter to the full yield of the intended warhead. Going by his advice and by several reports of the US government, India cannot become a nuclear weapons power without undertaking a proper testing programme.

Do We Really Have a Deterrent?

posted on May 16, 2007
Ashley Tellis, a key architect of the original India-US nuclear deal, has himself concluded that India cannot be credited with the capability to build boosted fission and fusion weapons. Further, he has even pleaded with the US Congress not to insist on extracting an Indian commitment to put a stop to nuclear testing, mindful of Indian sovereignty. Our own negotiating team did not seem to care.

The Case for Nuclear Testing

posted on May 15, 2007
Former, current and future Superpowers are all boosting their nuclear werewithal in preparation for what they see as an insecure future in a time of global power transition amidst a rising scarcity of natural resources. But we in India have decided that since we conducted six little, controversial tests, we have already become masters of all things nuclear. Our hubris will prove our undoing.

USAF Flies F-16, IAF Should Too, to Enhance Interoperability: Eric Rosborg

posted on February 10, 2007
The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet is perhaps the most impressive jet thundering over Bangalore skies at the AeroIndia 2007. Boeing is pitching this superb fighter for the IAF’s 126 MRCA order. But amid the intensifying dogfight between the world’s six fighter jet majors to grab the IAF order, there’s now a surprise twist. The USAF wants IAF to buy F-16 jets, not the Super Hornets.

Political, economic aspects key, not technical aspects in 126-jet deal: Komardin

posted on February 8, 2007
The Russians are pitching the MiG-35 into the 126-fighter competition. Their understanding is that technically, all competing fighters are more or less the same. It would be the political and economic package that would determine the winner. S. Raghotham spoke to Viktor Komardin, Deputy Director General, Rosoboronexport State Corporation, at Aero India 2007

Prepare Now for a Space Weapons NPT

posted on January 28, 2007
On January 11, China fired a ground-based ballistic missile into space to destroy one of its own weather satellites. It was not a great technological leap for China, except that it proved that China had missile guidance capability accurate enough to hit a small moving target 530 miles away. But what China did was to put the US on notice that it would not have a free run for its military in space.

Indians on the Moon. Amen!

posted on January 28, 2007
A Little over a year ago, Indian Space Research Organisation Director Madhavan Nair started a debate on whether India can achieve its space objectives by continuing with unmanned, robotic missions alone or whether manned missions are necessary. Now, the debate stands recast.

India Shying: Suddenly, a Strange Modesty

posted on January 28, 2007
Since 1990, the mood of India has swung several times from one extreme to another - from despondency to optimism, from self-doubt to jingoism, from a feeling of entitlement to first class world power status to a feeling that it must accept a second class status and move on. One such mood swing was evident at the CII Partnership Summit in Bangalore. But it is time for India to make up its mind.

India won't Conduct N-test Again

posted on January 25, 2007
The irony couldn't be greater. At a memorial lecture in honour of Dr. Raja Ramanna, one of the key members of the team that conducted the 1974 N-test and who requested Indira Gandhi's permission to conduct a second round of tests in 1983, the country's chief negotiator on the India-US nuclear 'deal' declared that India was unlikely to conduct a nuclear test in the future.

We'll Give India Everything, including the Mission Computer Source Code: Tony Ogilvy

posted on January 15, 2007
Fighter aircraft makers in the US, Europe and Russia are competing to win what will be the biggest foreign order in the world – the Indian Air Force wants 126 fighters. Gripen is in India to win the order for its JAS-39 fighters. Srinivasa Raghotham and Nirad Mudur asked Gripen’s India director, Scotsman Tony Ogilvy why the IAF should buy this relatively new aircraft.

N-bill will Scupper Weapons Programme

posted on December 17, 2006
United States President George Bush is to sign the Hyde Act into law on Monday. The Act will govern the terms of a future India-US nuclear cooperation agreement. Although both the US and Indian establishments have claimed that the bill does not constrain India’s nuclear weapons programme, its critics in India are worried that several of the bill’s provisions are designed to do exactly that.

Q&A: The Hyde Bill and its Implications

posted on December 12, 2006
The Hyde Act enabling the US to negotiate an agreement with India to resume nuclear trade with the latter is about to become law. But what does the Bill say exactly and how will it impact India's interests?

Edit: An Unnecessary Act

posted on December 11, 2006
The striking thing about this nuclear ‘deal’ and this long drawn-out legislation process, which has produced the ‘Hyde Act’ on India-US nuclear cooperation is that it was not necessary at all.

Q&A: The Hu Jintao Visit

posted on November 20, 2006
India-China relations have improved mainly due to mutual political restraint and due to the focus in both countries on their respective economic growth. But India-US relations have improved due to shared strategic interests. What's being attempted with China is to arrive at a modus vivendi with a neighbour and a peer, whereas what’s being attempted with the US is a strategic partnership.

Done Deal in the US Congress, Almost

posted on November 17, 2006
In early December, the ball will be in India’s court. But at least three unacceptable clauses will likely remain. First, the reporting requirements; second, the bill prohibits the transfer of reprocessing technologies; third, the bills stipulate that nuclear cooperation will end if India tests again.

Forget N-Deal, Nurture the Alliance

posted on November 12, 2006
The India-US relationship has shaped up into the first post-Cold War alliance between two major powers. It is the most important bilateral relationship of the twenty first century. It will be a tragedy if failure over the nuclear deal were allowed to damage this relationship.

Why We Won’t Get What We Want

posted on November 12, 2006
If a lot of strategic experts are still wondering whether the US Congress will pass the final nuclear deal bill in a way that does not seek to halt India’s nuclear progress, they must remember something about the nature of nuclear weapons and their owners: nuclear weapons allow their possessors to raise their ambitions, and they allow them to pursue independent foreign policies.

Democrats Won't be Kind to N-Deal Bill

posted on November 9, 2006
The Democrats are likely to make reconciliation of the House and Senate versions of the bill more difficult, especially any attempts to address Indian concerns over the several unacceptable clauses and references in the Senate version. That is, if the bill comes up for consideration at all in the Senate during the ‘lame duck’ session.

A Revolution in Space Affairs? - Part I

posted on October 28, 2006
The world stands at a moment of transformation. A combination of geopolitical/geostrategic change, accelerating pace of technology and the ongoing innovations in military thinking are launching back into space a part of the revolution that in the first place came from up there. As space historian Robert Zimmermann wrote recently, "We are at the dawn of a new colonial age''.

A Revolution in Space Affairs? - Part II

posted on October 28, 2006
The ability to identify the source of attack on one’s satellites, on-demand spacecraft launch capability, spacecraft autonomy and scoot-rendezvous- inspect-destroy capability are only some components of the Space Control capability that the US is currently developing -- in anticipation of a future when battles for supremacy on the earth will be fought in space as well.

N-Deal: Nothing to lose now

posted on August 20, 2006
After being put through months of anxiety as Indian negotiators seemed to be ‘selling out’ on the nuclear deal with the US, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s speech in the Rajya Sabha in mid-August and his subsequent meeting with former heads of the nuclear establishment have afforded the nation a measure of relief.

What are these strategic compromises for, after all? Part I

posted on August 11, 2006
After the heated debates of the past months over the Manmohan Singh-George Bush nuclear deal, it is now perhaps time to sit down and re-evaluate India’s objectives as well as the deal being considered in the US Congress as we wait for the Senate to take up the S. 3709 Bill in November.

What are these strategic compromises for, after all? Part II

posted on August 10, 2006
Ultimately, there is more than one way in which to produce power for the electrical grid. But there is only one currency of power in international politics, one guarantee of security in a world of nuclear weapons states – the possession of and readiness to use a large and high-quality nuclear arsenal. The nuclear deal being offered will endanger even our existing small, nuclear weapon capability.

How India surrendered the nuclear advantage

posted on July 26, 2006
First the Americans said the nuclear deal was for building a 'strategic partnership' with India. India applauded. Then the Americans said it was meant to achieve non-proliferation goals. Our government accepted that too. Those seeking enlightenment surrender to the Buddha. Manmohan Singh and Shyam Saran, seeking 'enlightened national interest', are surrendering the 'smiling Buddha' itself. for more

Nuclear deal: What 'ironclad' guarantees?

posted on July 19, 2006
During President Bush's visit to Delhi, Indian scientists had insisted on nuclear fuel supply guarantees and managed to get assurances from the US delegation. But the much bandied about 'ironclad guarantees' are about to become an 'ironcladding' around India to bind it to American non-proliferation objectives, and a 'guarantee' for the US that it can have India so bound and beholden. for more

Parliament Must Assume Control Over Nuclear Matters

posted on March 8, 2006
Up until now, India’s entire nuclear programme has been a closely guarded affair, with no parliamentary control over it. Jawaharlal Nehru instituted this arrangement in the 1940s to protect a fledgling nation’s fledgling nuclear programme from superpower pressures. Now that the PM himself is seeking to subject it to international inspections, the parliament must demand to be in charge.

Birbal's Wisdom and the Nuclear Deal

posted on March 1, 2006
America has only one choice. The world's lone superpower has to maintain stable international arrangements for the sake of perpetuating its own global pre-eminence. To do so, America must somehow integrate India into that order to prevent stresses from developing in it due to the combination of India's rising power and the freedom of action it has because of its outsider status. for more

Crucial question about N-deal

posted on February 28, 2006
In all the brouhaha over whether India should submit its fast breeder reactors to safeguards or not, the debate seems to have overlooked the crucial question that India should want an answer to when President Bush comes visiting: what kind of legislation and final agreement is the US Congress likely to ratify? Would they have implications for India’s military nuclear programme? for more

N-pact: the biggest deal breaker

posted on February 27, 2006
The Bush administration says, 'India's pledge to maintain its nuclear testing moratorium contributes to non-proliferation efforts by making its ending of nuclear explosive tests one of the conditions of full civil nuclear cooperation.' Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has ‘pledged’ to the Indian Parliament that nothing in the nuclear deal ‘amounts to limiting or inhibiting our nuclear weapons program for more

The Mongoose that Saved the Baby

posted on February 24, 2006
The story of the mongoose that saved a baby from a snake only to be killed by its rash mother flashed across my mind several times this past week as I read one writer after another accuse India’s nuclear scientists of every conceivable kind of undemocratic behaviour – simply because Dr. Anil Kakodkar wouldn’t allow the Breeder programme to be placed under safeguards as demanded by the US.

N-deal: Be careful what you wish for

posted on February 23, 2006
Even after the India-US deal, nuclear commerce will remain hostage to congressional reviews of Indian good behaviour. This is true for any sort of cooperation agreement the US Congress might ratify, except if India is excepted from all American non-proliferation laws and freed from reviews. The US Congress can stop nuclear cooperation for any reason at any point of time. for more

Time to redeem or reject nuclear deal

posted on February 16, 2006
The July 18 India-US Joint Statement was a result of a Bush administration initiative to find new allies who could help it counter rising China. Subsequently, however, it turned into a second-order non-proliferation effort.The time to either redeem or reject this deal is now. for more

Primary Evidence

How the Deal Changed -- July 20, 2006:: This document, Report 109-288, explains Senate Bill S. 3709. There are at least nine reasons why this Bill is a deal-killer in its present form. To mention just one -- Subparagraph 9 of Section 103 requires that India should not produce and use more uranium for its weapons programme than it does at present. Section 108 stipulates the reporting requirement to ensure this. Click here to download the PDF

How the Deal Changed -- July 21, 2006: This document accompanied the HR 5682 Bill passed by the House of Representatives. It explains the various sections of the Bill and how the House changed the deal from the one intended by the Bush administration. When the Bill was passed with a 359-68 majority, the Indian media had exulted that there were no 'deal-breakers' in the Bill. Read this document and decide for yourself. Click here to download the PDF

How the Deal Changed -- April 5 2006:: Condoleeza Rice tells the truth that the Manmohan Singh government would not. She clarified to senators that the fuel supply assurances discussed with India were against 'market imperfections', not guarantees of permanent supply, that the US would in no case give reprocessing technology, that India would be held to its non-proliferation commitments, that India would never dare test again Click here to download the PDF

How the Deal Changed -- March 16, 2006: This was the draft of the Bush administration's nuclear deal bill introduced in both the Senate and the House. Notice that the only objectionable clause is regarding the termination of nuclear cooperation if India conducted an explosive nuclear test. Although that was sufficient to kill the deal, more clauses have been added since to the versions being considered by the US Congress. Click here to download the PDF

How the Deal Changed -- March 7, 2006: And then, the PM made a speech, and gave more assurances to Parliament that everything is fine, India need not worry. So what if the nuclear deal is no longer what it was supposed to be under the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement Click here to download the PDF

How the Deal Changed -- March 7, 2006: Here is the nuclear separation plan tabled by the PM in Parliament. He asserts that it is in conformity with his assurances to Parliament. But can you tell me one country that has placed a cancer hospital, two theeoretical mathematics research institutes, etc, under IAEA safeguards? Click here to download the PDF

How the Deal Changed -- Nov. 2, 2005: Robert Joseph testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 2, 2005. Note how his interpretation of India's commitments changed, note how the tone of the US administration had changed with regard to India's commitments under the Joint Statement. Click here to download the PDF

How the Deal Changed -- Sept. 8, 2005: In this first hearing on the India-US nuclear deal, the Bush administration's purpose was still building a strategic partnership with India. Robert Joseph therefore interpreted the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement towards that end, especially with regard to voluntary acceptance of safeguards and nuclear testing. Click here to download the PDF

How the Deal Changed -- July 29, 2005: Assertions, and more assertions. None of which the Indian side has been able to hold on to during the negotiations with the US side. Read this amazing document, a 'backgrounder' released by the PMO in July 2005 to 'clarify' to the people what the nuclear deal meant. About the truth of it, suffice it to say that the Indian Embassy in Washington DC quietly removed the document from its website. Click here to download the PDF

How the Deal Changed -- July 29, 2005: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made a statement in Parliament following his visit to America in July 2005 during which the India-US Joint Statement was signed. Check the assertions made here and whether they have held since then. Click here to download the PDF

How the Deal Changed - July 18, 2005 : The India-US Joint Statement of July 18, 2005 was, in the main, a result of the American desire to build a strategic partnership with India. The obstacle to such a relationship was the nuclear issue between the two countries. Click here to download the PDF