(A modified version of this article was first published in Vijay Times, 17th November 2006)
The 100-member US Senate on Thursday passed its version of the India-US civil nuclear cooperation bill, S. 3709, with an overwhelming 85-12 majority, defeating several abnoxious amendments in the process.
Since the version of the bill passed by the House of Representatives, HR 5682, is different from the Senate bill, a select committee of representatives from both Houses will now sit together and hammer out a common bill and present it before a conference of both Houses for a vote. In all likelihood, this will happen in the first week of December.
The fact that the Senate took up the bill with such a sense of urgency, the fact that both Houses have now passed their bills with such overwhelming majorities, and the sentiments expressed with regard to the US-India relationship by Democrat leader Joseph Biden, all suggest that the nuclear cooperation bill is now more or less a done deal so far as the US is concerned.
Moreover, no new amendments can be brought in during the House-Senate conference. Even the time for debate is limited to six hours, divided equally between those pro and those against the bill.
It is now very likely that India’s concerns with regard to some language – such as on India-Iran relations -- as well as some concerns regarding the annual reporting requirements will be addressed in the final bill. There is a curious, and welcome, directive in the bill that the House sent to the Senate for reconciliation. After stating all the annual reporting requirements with regard to India’s production of fissile material, the bill directs that the annual reports should be ‘‘based on public information to the extent possible’’.
Nevertheless, at least three unacceptable clauses will likely remain. First, the very fact that there will be some kind of annual reporting requirement, a prerogative that the US Congress is unlikely to give up. Second, the bill prohibits the transfer of reprocessing technologies. India’s interpretation of ‘full civilian nuclear cooperation’ as envisaged under the July 18, 2005 deal is that it must include reprocessing technology, if not enrichment technologies too.
Third, both the House and Senate versions stipulate that nuclear cooperation will end if India conducts a nuclear test again. The bills allow neither for a force majeur clause, under which India would be able to conduct a test if its national security interest so demands or in reaction to, say, a Chinese or Pakistani test, nor for India to withdraw from international safeguards if it wants to – as per the American interpretation of the deal, India agreed to permanent safeguards on its civilian nuclear programme without condition and whether or not nuclear fuel supplies continue. India has said that it will continue to observe its self-imposed moratorium, but it will not accept a clause prohibiting it from testing in an international agreement.
In early December, therefore, the ball will be in India’s court.
If India does accept the deal coming out of the US Congress, the next battle will be in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, where China will likely oppose it – especially since it will be asked to agree to an exemption only for India.
However, following the positive vote in the US Congress, and considering that Russia, Britain, France and other nations at the NSG support a deal with India, China will come under pressure to ascent.
